The Kishau pact gives Delhi and Rajasthan Himachal Pradesh’s water share in exchange for taking on its power-cost liability, unlocking the stalled project.
NEW DELHI: Six chief ministers signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Agreement on September 15, 2026 to advance the long-pending Kishau Multipurpose Project on the Tons River, ending an eight-year institutional impasse that had stalled one of the Upper Yamuna basin’s most significant water infrastructure schemes. The ceremony, presided over by Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Union Jal Shakti Minister C R Patil, brought together the chief ministers of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana and Delhi, along with roughly 28 sub-agreements covering the operational and financial details of the project.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah described the pact as the tenth inter-state water dispute resolved through negotiated consensus since 2018. The agreement formalises an in-principle consensus reached on June 16, 2026 and its immediate next step is placement before the Union Cabinet for financial and administrative sanction.
A Dam Eight Years in the Making
The Kishau project proposes a 232.6-metre concrete gravity dam straddling the border between Dehradun district in Uttarakhand and Sirmaur district in Himachal Pradesh, on the Tons River, the Yamuna’s principal tributary. Official figures put the reservoir’s storage capacity at 1,562 million cubic metres, though technical appraisals cite a gross capacity closer to 1,786 MCM. The power complex is expected to generate 422 MW, producing 1,476 million units of clean energy annually, while the irrigation system aims to create a fresh command area of approximately 97,000 hectares across downstream states.
Cost estimates in tier-1 media range between ₹15,000 crore and ₹15,624 crore, though official government statements have so far omitted a final figure, reflecting ongoing refinement of the Detailed Project Report. As a designated National Project, the Centre will fund 90% of the water component, with the remaining 10% shared among the basin states.
The Deal That Broke the Deadlock
At the heart of the eight-year delay lay a straightforward problem. Himachal Pradesh, as a host state, was expected to shoulder ₹800 crore to ₹2,000 crore toward the power component’s capital cost, even though the project’s water benefits flowed almost entirely to downstream states. The hill state consistently refused to sign, arguing it was unfair to bear submergence, displacement and debt for infrastructure that primarily served other jurisdictions.
The 2026 resolution rests on a cost-and-benefit swap. Himachal Pradesh agreed to hand over its entire water share to Delhi and Rajasthan, and in exchange, those two states agreed to absorb Himachal Pradesh’s power component liability in a 75:25 ratio, with Delhi bearing the larger share. Himachal Pradesh retains its statutory entitlement to free power as a host state and can sell electricity from the plant without spending any capital upfront. Separately, the Centre has committed to easing Uttarakhand’s contribution burden through complementary central schemes.
What Each State Gets
Delhi is set to receive an additional 110 MCM of raw water for municipal supply, its largest single allocation under the deal. Rajasthan will receive 124 MCM, intended to address chronic drinking water shortages in the Shekhawati region spanning Sikar, Jhunjhunu and Churu districts, delivered via a proposed underground pipeline network from the Hathnikund Barrage. Haryana and Uttar Pradesh receive 633 MCM and 411 MCM respectively for irrigation and industrial use, while Uttarakhand gets 34 MCM along with host-state execution rights. The government has also projected that roughly 25% of the water made available will support environmental flows in the Yamuna, aligned with river rejuvenation targets under the National Mission for Clean Ganga.
Concerns That Remain Unaddressed
Independent experts have raised pointed objections to several official claims. Himanshu Thakkar of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People has flagged the seismic risk of building a 232.6-metre dam in the geologically active Lesser Himalayan thrust zone, a concern sharpened by the possibility of cloudbursts and glacial lake outburst floods in the upper catchment.
On displacement, feasibility data from 2020 estimates that the reservoir will submerge approximately 2,950 hectares, including 2,438 hectares of forest and 512 hectares of multi-cropped agricultural land supporting ginger and tomato cultivation, displacing around 5,498 people across 17 villages. Mansi Ashar of the Himdhara Environmental Research and Action Collective has argued that these figures rely on outdated surveys rather than field-verified assessments. Separately, water analysts contest the government’s rejuvenation claim, arguing that impounding the Tons, the Yamuna’s cleanest tributary, to dilute untreated urban sewage downstream is ecologically counterproductive compared to fixing sewage treatment directly.
Land classification records add further ambiguity. Documentation from 1997 and 2018 had classified 1,749 hectares of the forest land as state-owned, but 2026 submissions to the Expert Appraisal Committee list only 689 hectares under Reserve and Civil Forest categories, leaving the legal status of the remainder unresolved.
What Happens Next
The agreement is a political milestone, not a construction start. Before any work begins, the project needs Union Cabinet sanction, an updated Detailed Project Report reflecting current costs, Stage-II Forest Clearance, Environment Clearance from the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, and approval from the National Board for Wildlife. Rajasthan’s share, in particular, hinges on the parallel construction of a roughly 580 MCM underground pipeline network, while the executing agency, Kishau Corporation Limited, must still secure Gram Sabha consent and complete land acquisition across the 17 affected villages.
Whether the deal marks a genuine breakthrough in India’s federal water politics or simply shifts old tensions onto a new financial formula, will depend on how these clearances and resettlement processes unfold over the coming years.
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