Former Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina remains at the center of unresolved political and diplomatic tensions between New Delhi and Dhaka.
Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s arrival in New Delhi on April 7, calling for a relationship based on “mutual respect and shared interests,” is the stuff of diplomatic froth. Indian official reaction was favorable. A new High Commissioner is on the way. Visa services between the two countries are gradually being restored after an 18-month slowdown that sharply reduced cross-border travel and business movement. Visitor visa issuance reportedly fell from nearly 1.4 million in 2023-24 to below 300,000 during the slowdown period before phased restoration began in 2026. (Source: VisaVerge)
This is viewed as advancement. It is mostly optics.
The structural fault lines which left India–Bangladesh relations damaged in 2024 remained unresolved even after 18 months of the Yunus interim government. They have merely been pushed aside as both sides perform the minimum necessary for a working relationship. This still does not amount to a strategic reset. At best, it is a tactical pause in tensions.
There are three questions that will determine whether this bilateral relationship truly turns around. None of them have answers yet.
The Hasina Problem
Sheikh Hasina has been in India since August 2024, when she stepped down amid student protests and took shelter in New Delhi. The BNP’s return to power under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman in 2026 reignited security concerns in India, including fears relating to insurgent groups, minority protection and growing Chinese influence in Bangladesh.
The issue, however, is political, as the government of Tarique Rahman has made accountability for the Hasina era a major domestic priority. Dhaka’s calls for accountability regarding Sheikh Hasina are about more than legal proceedings; her continued presence in India is seen by many in Bangladesh as a symbol of New Delhi’s unconditional support for the government that was overthrown.
India cannot simply hand over Sheikh Hasina. It would reinforce allegations that New Delhi backed an authoritarian regime and could create an uncomfortable precedent in the region. However, any prolonged uncertainty over the issue risks poisoning the relationship further, especially in an already politically volatile Bangladesh.
After a visibly strained phase in bilateral ties, India now appears prepared for a fresh approach, recognizing that there is no technocratic way to patch over a political rupture. That recognition is important. But if recalibration does not address the Hasina issue, then moving around the pieces while ignoring the cracked foundation will amount to little more than repainting the house.
Teesta – The Deal That Never Happens
The negotiation of a water-sharing arrangement over the Teesta River has remained stalled since 2011 despite repeated rounds of talks and periodic claims of progress. West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s long-standing opposition to the agreement remains a major political obstacle, and successive governments in Delhi have been unable to resolve the deadlock so far. However, shifting political dynamics in Bengal may create new possibilities.
The 1996 Ganga Water Treaty is scheduled to expire in December 2026. Negotiations over its renewal are inevitable, and they are unlikely to proceed without difficult bargaining. Dhaka wants water-sharing arrangements that are equitable and climate-resilient. With the Ganga treaty nearing expiry, Bangladesh fears risks to agriculture, food security and climate resilience if renewal talks break down or if the treaty becomes vulnerable to repeal or replacement.
Water is not a side issue in Bangladesh. It is existential. These shared rivers directly affect agriculture, food security, livelihoods and climate vulnerability.
Successive Bangladeshi governments since 2011 have repeatedly been told that the Teesta deal is imminent. Yet the Teesta remains the single most contentious unresolved issue between the two countries despite more than 54 shared rivers between them.
The BNP and its voter base are fully aware of this history. Tarique Rahman may be pragmatic when it comes to visas and diplomatic language, but he cannot afford to appear as though he is accepting the same unfulfilled promises made to previous administrations. If India fails to address the issue before the Ganga treaty expires in December 2026, the reset will remain stuck on the issue that matters most to rural Bangladesh: water.
BNP Is Not Pro-India, It Is Pragmatic
When India thinks about Tarique Rahman, memories of the BNP government between 2001 and 2006 still dominate strategic thinking. That period was widely described as one of the lowest points in bilateral ties, with India accusing the BNP-led government of sheltering insurgent groups from the Northeast such as ULFA and NDFB.
Unlike earlier BNP governments, Tarique Rahman has signaled a more pragmatic approach toward India. His political support base is not necessarily pro-India, but strongly anti-Awami League. Anti-India sentiment deepened in Bangladesh during the 18 months of the Yunus interim government, while countries such as Pakistan, Turkey and China expanded their engagement with Dhaka. That sentiment does not disappear simply because the BNP has returned to power.
India’s Union Budget for FY2026-27 reduced development assistance allocated to Bangladesh from Rs 120 crore to Rs 60 crore, a 50 percent cut compared to the previous fiscal year. The reduction has been widely interpreted as a sign that New Delhi is becoming more cautious in its engagement with Dhaka amid strained bilateral relations. (Source: The Daily Star)
This is not surprising. It is also a problem. Countries that expanded their influence in Bangladesh during the diplomatic downturn, including Pakistan, Turkey and China, were not cautious.
India’s most economically integrated neighbor witnessed a political revolution, an interim government openly opposed to Delhi that ruled for 18 months, and the return of a party with a complicated history with India.
The restoration of visas and the Foreign Minister’s visit are necessary steps, but they are not adequate. Whether India can recalibrate ties without damaging precedents, whether agreements can be reached before December 2026, and whether Delhi can build credibility with the BNP’s political base will determine whether this thaw becomes durable.
So far, none of these questions have been resolved. The dialogue has resumed. The difficult work has not.
Watch this space: whether Prime Minister Tarique Rahman visits New Delhi ahead of the December 2026 expiry of the Ganga Water Treaty. That visit, or its absence, may reveal whether this is merely a diplomatic thaw or the beginning of a genuine strategic reset.
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