CHENNAI, TAMIL NADU: On the evening of May 8, 2026, Vijay, leader of the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), walked into Raj Bhavan in Chennai and submitted signed letters of support from 116 MLAs to Governor Rajendra Arlekar. He walked out without an invitation to form the government. Two signatures short of the 118-seat majority mark in the 234-member Assembly, the Governor stated that TVK had failed to demonstrate sufficient majority support. As of the morning of May 9, the swearing-in ceremony has not taken place.
The Tamil Nadu Episode
The 2026 Tamil Nadu Assembly election produced a historic result. TVK, contesting its first election under film star-turned-politician Vijay, emerged as the single largest party with 108 seats. The DMK, which had governed the state, won 59, while the AIADMK secured 47. Congress won 5 seats. The remaining seats were distributed among VCK, CPI, CPI(M), IUML, AMMK, PMK and others.
The majority mark in the 234-member Assembly is 118. TVK fell ten seats short. What followed was a week of coalition negotiations, competing claims and escalating constitutional tension.
Tamil Nadu Assembly Election 2026 Snapshot
| Party | Seats Won |
|---|---|
| TVK | 108 |
| DMK | 59 |
| AIADMK | 47 |
| Congress | 5 |
| Others | 15 |
| Majority Mark | 118 |
On May 5, Vijay met Governor Arlekar and staked his claim. On May 7, he returned with approximately 112 signatures. On May 8, he submitted 116. Each time, the Governor declined to issue an invitation, stating that TVK had not yet demonstrated majority support. Meanwhile, a separate controversy erupted around AMMK’s lone MLA, S. Kamaraj, whose support was claimed by TVK. TTV Dhinakaran, AMMK’s leader, rushed to Raj Bhavan alleging the MLA had gone missing and that his support letter was forged. Kamaraj subsequently appeared alongside Dhinakaran and confirmed he had not extended support to TVK, causing the MLA count to fall back to 115.
Simultaneously, VCK, whose support TVK needs, is seeking the Deputy Chief Minister’s post for party chief Thol Thirumavalavan, while TVK has offered the Urban Affairs portfolio. The gap between the two positions has delayed the submission of VCK’s formal support letters, which were expected Saturday morning.
The Governor’s stated position throughout has been consistent: he requires proof of 118 before issuing an invitation. Political analyst R. Kannan has defended the Governor’s approach, arguing that he is well within his constitutional right to seek proof of majority before inviting TVK to form the government, noting that historical precedents exist for seeking letters of support before issuing an invitation.
Critics have taken the opposite view. Several parties urged the Governor to invite Vijay to form the government and prove his majority through a floor test in the Assembly, arguing that the constitutional sequence is invitation first and floor test second, not proof of majority before invitation.
What the Constitution Actually Says
The Indian Constitution does not contain a single provision that specifically addresses what a Governor must do when no party wins a majority. Article 163 establishes that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor, with discretion reserved only for matters where the Constitution specifically requires it. Article 164(1) states that the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor. Neither article specifies the sequence, timeline, or criteria for that appointment in a hung Assembly.
The emergence of a hung Assembly presents a profound challenge to the constitutional order, elevating the Governor’s role from a ceremonial figurehead to a pivotal arbiter of democratic stability. The Governor’s exercise of discretion in such instances is a quasi-judicial function that must be strictly insulated from the vagaries of partisan politics. At the heart of this tension lies the affirmative duty to respect the democratic mandate embodied by the single largest party versus the constitutional imperative to ensure a stable and viable executive.
The Supreme Court’s landmark judgement in SR Bommai v Union of India (1994) remains the most authoritative statement on this question. A nine-judge bench held that the floor of the Assembly is the proper place to test majority, not the Raj Bhavan. The Governor cannot make a subjective determination of majority support as a precondition to issuing an invitation. In a situation arising after a general election, the Governor has to invite the leader of the party commanding majority in the House, or the single largest party or group, to form the government.
In Rameshwar Prasad v Union of India (2006), the Supreme Court went further, holding that a Governor cannot act arbitrarily and that his actions remain subject to judicial review despite the personal immunity granted under Article 361. The Nabam Rebia case of 2016 reinforced that the Governor’s discretion cannot override the principle of aid and advice.
The Goa precedent and the Karnataka precedent both authorise the invitation that the single largest party seeks. The Supreme Court has, in those cases, held that an invitation to the largest single party with declared post-poll support is constitutionally orthodox. The further requirement is that the floor test must follow at the earliest practicable date.
The constitutional sequence established by these judgements is therefore clear: invitation first, floor test second. Requiring proof of majority as a precondition to invitation inverts that sequence and is open to legal challenge.
Five Times India Has Been Here Before
India’s constitutional history is littered with hung Assembly controversies that illuminate the Tamil Nadu situation.
In Bihar in 2005, Governor Buta Singh did not invite any leader to test strength on the floor of the House after a hung verdict. He instead recommended dissolution of the Assembly. The Supreme Court later indicted this as mala fide and quashed the decision, establishing that pre-emptive dissolution without a floor test is constitutionally impermissible.
In Goa in 2017, the Congress emerged as the single largest party with 17 seats in a 40-member House. The Governor invited the BJP, which had 13 seats but had assembled a post-poll coalition. The Congress challenged this and the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the outcome after a floor test confirmed the BJP’s majority. The episode established that a post-poll coalition with demonstrated majority can legitimately be preferred over a single largest party without one.
Manipur in 2017 followed a nearly identical pattern. The Congress won 28 seats in a 60-member House, a clear plurality. The Governor invited the BJP, which had 21 seats but had assembled alliance partners. The Supreme Court monitored a floor test and the BJP retained power. The constitutional lesson was the same: majority demonstrated on the floor is what counts, not plurality at the ballot box.
Karnataka in 2018 produced the sharpest judicial intervention. The BJP won 104 seats in a 224-member House, falling short of the majority mark of 113. The Congress and JD(S) had 78 and 38 seats respectively and formed a post-poll coalition of 116. The Governor invited the BJP as the single largest party. The Supreme Court convened a midnight hearing and ordered a floor test within a compressed timeframe. The BJP’s B.S. Yediyurappa resigned before the floor test, unable to demonstrate majority. The Congress-JD(S) government was then sworn in. The lesson established was decisive: where a post-poll coalition demonstrably commands majority, the Governor cannot bypass it by inviting the single largest party.
Maharashtra in 2019 was the most dramatic episode. The BJP’s Devendra Fadnavis was sworn in at dawn without any public indication that a coalition had been assembled. The Shiv Sena-NCP-Congress combine, which claimed 162 seats in a 288-member House, rushed to the Supreme Court. The court ordered an immediate floor test and Fadnavis resigned without facing it. The lesson was that time-bound floor tests are mandatory and swearing in without demonstrated majority will not survive judicial scrutiny.
In each of these cases, the party in power at the Centre was the BJP. In each case, critics alleged that the Governor’s actions reflected central government pressure rather than constitutional principle. Those allegations were political claims, not judicial findings. What the courts established in each case was the constitutional standard, not the political motivation behind any individual Governor’s decision.
What the Commissions Recommended
Three major commissions have addressed the Governor’s role in hung Assemblies. None of their recommendations have been enacted into law, and all remain advisory.
The Sarkaria Commission of 1983 recommended a clear priority order: first, invite the leader of a pre-poll alliance that is the largest grouping, then the single largest party if it claims majority support with post-poll backing, and explore all options before recommending President’s Rule. The Commission emphasised that the Governor should be an independent constitutional authority, not an agent of the Centre.
The Punchhi Commission of 2010 broadly endorsed the Sarkaria framework but placed greater emphasis on time limits for parties to demonstrate their claims. It recommended that the party or combination claiming the widest support should be called to form the government and that the floor test should follow within a defined period.
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution echoed both, urging that Governors avoid partisan conduct and consult the outgoing Chief Minister before acting in a hung Assembly situation.
What Experts Say Should Change
There are historical precedents for what is happening now. When Atal Bihari Vajpayee returned to power in 1998 after his earlier government collapsed, the President also sought letters of support before inviting him to form the government. There are also examples where Governors invited the single largest party without sufficient proof and later faced legal scrutiny.
The academic consensus among constitutional law scholars leans strongly toward codification. The core argument is that Bommai established the principle but left the mechanics unspecified, creating a gap that allows Governors to delay indefinitely without technically violating any written rule. A constitutional amendment specifying that the single largest party must be invited within 48 hours of staking a claim and that a floor test must follow within seven days would close that gap without removing the Governor’s role entirely.
The counter-argument, associated with the late Arun Jaitley among others, is that codification removes the flexibility that the framers deliberately built in, that a rigid rule cannot anticipate every possible hung Assembly scenario and that judicial review provides a sufficient check on arbitrary gubernatorial conduct.
Comparative constitutional practice offers some guidance. In the United Kingdom, there is no equivalent of a Governor. The Prime Minister who commands confidence simply continues. In Australia, the Governor-General, by convention, invites the party leader who can demonstrate majority support, with the floor of the House as the ultimate arbiter. In Canada, the Governor-General follows a similar convention, with time-bound confidence votes providing the check.
What each of these systems has that India lacks is either a codified convention or a clear procedural timeline. The absence of one in India is not an accident; it is a choice that each successive Parliament has made by not acting on the recommendations of three separate commissions over four decades.
The Unresolved Question
Tamil Nadu 2026 will eventually resolve. VCK’s letters are expected Saturday morning. If they arrive in the correct format and TVK crosses 118, the swearing-in will follow. The constitutional crisis will end without a Supreme Court intervention this time.
But the underlying question will remain open. A Governor’s discretion to demand proof of majority before issuing an invitation, rather than issuing the invitation and ordering a floor test, sits in a legal grey zone that Bommai identified but did not fully close. Every hung Assembly in India risks reopening that zone.
The solution is not complicated. It has been recommended three times by three separate commissions. It requires a constitutional amendment specifying the sequence and timeline that the Supreme Court has established through case law: invitation to the single largest party within a defined period, a floor test within a defined period thereafter and a prohibition on demanding majority proof as a precondition to the invitation itself.
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